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THE SEARCH FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF
18 U.S.C. § 2423(C)
Jessica E. Notebaert *
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2011, the Third Circuit became the first U.S. court of
appeals to definitively address the constitutionality of a federal statute
criminalizing citizens’ noncommercial, overseas sexual conduct. 1 In United
States v. Pendleton, it upheld the noncommercial prong2 of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(c) against the defendant’s facial challenge. 3 The Pendleton court,
like other courts that have considered the issue, held that the Foreign
Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to pass § 2423(c), which
criminalizes “travel[ing] in foreign commerce, and engag[ing] in any illicit
sexual conduct with another person.” 4 But no two courts have used
*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Yale University, 2008. I am
grateful for the thoughtful editorial assistance of Liz Cartwright, Daniel Faichney, Tim Fry,
Jonathan Jacobson, Caitlin Kovacs, Megan Lawson, Olesya Salnikova, Kelsey B. Shust,
Hannah Wendling, and the staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
1
United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308–11 (3d Cir. 2011). Other courts have
explicitly reserved the issue, declining to address it until it would be dispositive of the case
before the court. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2006).
2
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) criminalizes two types of conduct—engaging in commercial sex
acts and committing the sexual abuse of a minor. See infra text accompanying notes 19–24.
Accordingly, the statute is said to have two prongs, a “commercial” prong and a
“noncommercial” prong. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105.
3
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 311.
4
18 U.S.C.§ 2423(c); Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 308–11; see also Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103;
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d. 951, 954–957 (E.D. Wis. 2012); United States v.
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19,
2007 WL 1521123, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007); cf. United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d
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precisely the same reasoning in reaching that conclusion, leaving the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) on shaky constitutional ground. 5
This Comment analyzes the possible constitutional justifications for
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), which has primarily been used to
prosecute U.S. citizens who engage in child sex abuse overseas. It
advocates for a single test to determine the constitutionality of a criminal
statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority.
It also argues that there is an alternate constitutional basis for statutes
criminalizing citizens’ overseas conduct—Congress’s power to pass laws
effectuating treaty obligations. As prosecutions of § 2423(c) violations
become more frequent, 6 definitively resolving the statute’s constitutional
status may prevent protracted pretrial proceedings disputing the statute’s
legitimacy and normalize decisions across the lower federal courts.
Part II of this Comment describes the background of § 2423(c),
including the statute’s origins, current form, and operation. It also surveys
recent Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to
§ 2423(c), with the goal of identifying and analyzing the different
approaches taken by lower federal courts.
Part III.A articulates a test for analyzing whether a statute that
criminalizes citizens’ overseas conduct is constitutional under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. Applying that test, this Part concludes that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause when it passed
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). Part III.B argues that prosecutions
under § 2423(c) of noncommercial child sex abuse occurring overseas may
be constitutionally sound, but under Congress’s Necessary and Proper
Clause powers, not its Foreign Commerce Clause authority. The Necessary
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to pass laws, such as § 2423(c), to
implement the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (Optional Protocol), a
multilateral treaty to which the United States is a signatory. 7
200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (reaching the same conclusion in a case litigating the constitutional
status of a related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 66–147.
6
Justice News, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the
National Summit on Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation (Oct. 14, 2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-1110141.html (“In recent
years, investigations and prosecutions of child exploitation crimes have increased
dramatically. . . . [The challenge of child exploitation] demands our most aggressive,
innovative, and comprehensive possible response.”).
7
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,
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Part III.C argues that prosecutors who wish to avoid litigating the
unsettled constitutional status of § 2423(c) can obtain substantially the same
results for substantially the same conduct under a related statute, § 2423(b).
Section 2423(b) criminalizes, in pertinent part, “travel[ing] in foreign
commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person.” 8 The drafters of the 2003 PROTECT (Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today) Act
passed § 2423(c) because they feared that the need to prove intent under
§ 2423(b) prevented prosecutors from aggressively prosecuting sex
offenders. 9 But this fear is proving unfounded because of the ways in
which modern investigatory techniques, Federal Rule of Evidence 414, and
the increasingly frequent admission of expert testimony in child sex
exploitation cases have affected criminal trial practice.
Finally, Part IV summarizes the arguments contained in Parts II–III
and comments briefly on the significance of settling the issues discussed
therein. In an era of globalization, Congress’s increasing attempts to exert
its reach extraterritorially require courts to be able to engage in informed
discussions regarding Congress’s constitutional authority to criminalize
citizens’ overseas conduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TRACKING THE ORIGINS AND OPERATION OF SECTION 2423(C)

Section 2423(c) was one of a number of provisions enacted in 2003 as
part of the PROTECT Act, a comprehensive piece of federal legislation
designed to address the growing concern over child pornography, sex
tourism, and other forms of sexual exploitation of children. 10 It is one of

opened for signature May 25, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227
(entered into force Jan. 18, 2002); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
8
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (emphasis added).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 30–36.
10
S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 1–2 (2003) (explaining that the purposes of the PROTECT Act
were “to restore the government’s ability to prosecute child pornography offenses
successfully” and to “accomplish several other changes in existing law to aid in the
investigation and prosecution of child pornography offenses, such as creating extraterritorial
jurisdiction”); 149 CONG. REC. 445–46 (2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (summarizing
the PROTECT Act and its goals); 149 CONG. REC. 9079 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sue
Myrick) (“The PROTECT Act sends a clear message to those who prey upon children that if
they commit these crimes, they will be punished. This legislation provides stronger penalties
against kidnapping, ensures lifetime supervision of sexual offenders and kidnappers of
children, gives law enforcement the tools it needs to effectively prosecute these crimes, and
provides assistance to the community when a child is abducted.”).
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four related provisions, sometimes called the “travel statutes,” 11 that
criminalize travel in interstate or foreign commerce that is connected to
sexual abuse. 12
The first of the other three provisions, § 2421, criminalizes
transporting an individual in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent
that the individual engage in prostitution or any other criminal sexual
activity. 13 The current version of § 2421 originated in 1910 as the Mann
Act, once known as the White-Slave Traffic Act. 14 The purpose behind the
Mann Act was “to protect women who were weak from men who were
bad,” 15 although its scope has since expanded.16 The second provision,
§ 2423(a), criminalizes transporting a minor in interstate or foreign
commerce with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution or any other
criminal sexual activity. 17 The third, § 2423(b), criminalizes traveling in
interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in any illicit
sexual conduct, as defined by statute.18
Section 2423(c) criminalizes traveling in foreign commerce and
engaging in illicit sexual conduct.19 Illicit sexual conduct is defined in
§ 2423(f) as:
(1) [A] sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that
would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex

11

See VIRGINIA M. KENDALL & T. MARKUS FUNK, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND
TRAFFICKING: EXAMINING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. RESPONSES 91–107 (2012).
12
United States v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010).
13
18 U.S.C. § 2421.
14
See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)); McGuire, 627 F.3d at 624. The original Mann
Act criminalized, inter alia, transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, “any woman or
girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with
the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute
or to give herself up to debauchery.” Mann Act, 36 Stat. at 825.
15
Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960) (quoting Denning v. United States,
247 F. 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1918)).
It was in response to shocking revelations of subjugation of women too weak to resist that
Congress acted. . . . As the legislative history discloses, the Act reflects the supposition that the
women with whom it sought to deal often had no independent will of their own, and embodies,
in effect, the view that they must be protected against themselves.

Id. at 530 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 61-47, at 10–11 (1910)).
16
Compare Mann Act, 36 Stat. 825 (focusing on transporting women and girls for
“prostitution or debauchery”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (focusing on transporting anyone for
any criminal sex offenses).
17
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).
18
Id. § 2423(b).
19
Id. § 2423(c).
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20

The combination of § 2423(c) and (f)(2) criminalizes, in a nutshell, giving
or receiving anything of value in exchange for any sex act with a minor. 21
This combination is known as the “commercial prong” of the sex tourism
statute. 22 The combination of § 2423(c) and (f)(1) criminalizes the sexual
abuse of minors. 23 This combination is known as the “noncommercial
prong” of the sex tourism statute. 24
The purpose of 2003’s PROTECT Act was to “give[] law enforcement
authorities valuable new tools to deter, detect, investigate, prosecute, and
punish crimes against America’s children.” 25 In addition to drafting new
provisions increasing prosecutors’ ability to track and collect evidence
against child pornographers, the PROTECT Act substantially revised
18 U.S.C. § 2423. 26 The PROTECT Act replaced the then-current version
of § 2423(b) with § 2423(b)–(g). 27 The revision left § 2423(b) substantially
intact, 28 but added § 2423(c) (“Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign
places”), § 2423(d) (“Ancillary offenses,” i.e., “arrang[ing], induc[ing],
procur[ing], or facilitat[ing] the travel of a person knowing that such a
person is traveling in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of
engaging in illicit sexual conduct”), § 2423(e) (“Attempt and conspiracy”),
§ 2423(f) (defining “illicit sexual conduct”), and § 2423(g) (providing an
affirmative defense to certain charges under this statute). 29
20

Id. § 2423(f). Per 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2):

[T]he term “sexual act” means—(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the
anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration,
however slight; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the
mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another
by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the
clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

Chapter 109A criminalizes: aggravated sexual abuse (id. § 2241); sexual abuse (id. § 2242);
sexual abuse of a minor or ward (id. § 2243); and abusive sexual conduct (id. § 2244).
21
18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(e)(3), 2423(c), 2423(f)(2).
22
See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2006).
23
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–48, 2423(c), 2423(f)(1).
24
See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1109–10.
25
Presidential Statement on Signing the PROTECT Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 504 (Apr. 30, 2003).
26
See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 105(a), § 2423, 117 Stat. 650, 653–54
(2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006)).
27
See id.
28
The conspiracy prong of the old version of § 2423(b) was moved to § 2423(e) of the
new version. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000), with sec. 105(a), 117 Stat. at 654.
29
Sec. 105(a), 117 Stat. at 653–54.
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The primary effect of adding § 2423(c) was to remove one of the
greatest barriers to enforcement of § 2423(b)—the requirement that
prosecutors prove that mens rea existed prior to travel. 30 Under the
precursor to § 2423(c)—the pre-2003 version of § 2423(b) 31—a prosecutor
had to prove that a defendant formed the intent to engage in illicit sexual
activity prior to his travel in interstate or foreign commerce. 32
The PROTECT Act eliminated this intent requirement.33 The
conference report regarding the Act stated, “Current law requires the
government to prove that the defendant traveled with the intent to engage in
the illegal activity. Under [§ 2423(c)], the government would only have to
prove that the defendant engaged in illicit sexual conduct with a minor
while in a foreign country.” 34 In other words, a defendant could be
prosecuted for traveling to a foreign country and engaging in illicit sex in
violation of § 2423(c), even if he had no preconceived intent to do so. 35
Thus, the elements that prosecutors now need to prove under § 2423(c) are:
(1) that the defendant is either a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence; (2) that the defendant traveled in
foreign commerce; and (3) that while the defendant was in the foreign
place, he engaged in illicit sexual conduct with another person. 36
30
Congress first attempted to eliminate the need for prosecutors to prove the intent
element in sex tourism cases in the Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act (STPIA),
which was proposed, but not passed, in 2002. Clark, 435 F.3d. at 1104 (citing H.R. REP. NO.
107-525, at 2–3 (2002)). The STPIA would have added a statute to the books that
criminalized illicit sexual activities while abroad, regardless of whether the defendant had
formed the intent to do so prior to traveling overseas. H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002).
Although the STPIA failed, the PROTECT Act, proposed just a year later, adopted its
language nearly verbatim in § 2423(c). Compare id. at 2–3, with H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 5
(2003) (Conf. Rep.).
31
PROTECT Act, sec. 105(a), § 2423, 117 Stat. at 653–54 (describing the changes to the
existing statute).
32
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000) (amended 2003).
33
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
34
H.R. REP. NO. 108-66, at 51 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); see also United States v. Martinez,
599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 803 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 635 (2012)
[hereinafter 7th Cir. PJI]; Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 11th Cir. § 93.3 (2010)
[hereinafter 11th Cir. PJI]. “To ‘travel in foreign commerce’ means that the defendant
moved from a place within the United States to a place outside the United States.” 11th Cir.
PJI, supra, § 93.3. “[I]llicit sexual conduct” means: (1) “causing a person under 18 years of
age to engage in a sexual act by using force or placing that person in fear that any person
will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping”; (2) “a sexual act with a
person under 18 years of age after rendering that person unconscious or administering a
drug, intoxicant, or other substance that substantially impairs a person”; (3) “a sexual act
with a person who is under 16 years of age and is at least four years younger than the
defendant”; or (4) “a commercial sex act with a person under 18 years of age.” Id.
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The PROTECT Act did not include a jurisdictional statement,37 and
the legislative history surrounding its passage makes no explicit reference
to a constitutional provision giving Congress the power to pass such widesweeping legislation.
By contrast, the Sex Tourism Prohibition
Improvement Act (STPIA), a precursor to the PROTECT Act that was
proposed but not passed in 2002, included a “Constitutional Authority
Statement” grounding Congress’s authority to pass the law in its power to
regulate commerce under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 38
When Congress enacted the PROTECT Act instead of the STPIA, it
neglected to include a similar statement of constitutional authority. 39
Nevertheless, courts that have considered the constitutionality of the
PROTECT Act appear to have assumed that the Commerce Clause and, in
the case of § 2423(c), the Foreign Commerce Clause, authorized Congress
to pass the Act. 40
B. OBSERVING § 2423(C)’S NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG IN ACTION: THE
PROSECUTION OF THOMAS PENDLETON

On July 24, 2008, Thomas S. Pendleton, a Pennsylvania native and

37

The Ninth Circuit recognized this in United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006).
38
H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 5 (2002).
39
The proponents of the preconference version of Senate Bill 151, which proposed
amendments and additions to existing child pornography laws that would eventually become
part of the PROTECT Act, did spend a great deal of time discussing the constitutionality of
the proposed laws. However, they focused exclusively on the portions of the statute that
were responding to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), a Supreme
Court case that implicated the First Amendment in child pornography prosecutions. See 149
CONG. REC. 448–50 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). In particular, Senator Leahy
discussed the steps the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had taken to ensure that the
reforms to the child pornography prosecution laws were constitutional in light of Free
Speech Coalition. See id. at 449 (“At our hearing . . . Constitutional and criminal law
scholars—one of whom was the same person who warned us last time that [previous
legislation] would be struck down—stated that the PROTECT Act as introduced in the last
Congress could withstand Constitutional scrutiny, although there were parts that were very
close to the line.”); see also id. at 445 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“We must now act
quickly to repair our child pornography laws to provide for effective law enforcement in a
manner that accords with the Court’s ruling.”). There was no discussion of the
constitutionality of the sex tourism statutes once they were added in the conference report.
Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 108-66 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); 149 CONG. REC. 9079–96 (relaying testimony
regarding the conference report before the House of Representatives).
40
See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308–311 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–08 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954–57 (E.D. Wis. 2012); United States v.
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19,
2007 WL 1521123, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007).
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U.S. citizen, was indicted by a federal grand jury under § 2423(c).41
Pendleton was tried on that indictment in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware in September 2009. 42 The facts adduced at
Pendleton’s trial told a disturbing story of child sexual exploitation.43 In
late November 2005, Pendleton traveled from Philadelphia to Germany. 44
Shortly after arriving in Germany, Pendleton met a fourteen-year-old boy
named Dieter. 45 Dieter resided at a group home because his father passed
away and his mother was too ill to raise him. 46 Pendleton and Dieter struck
up a friendship, corresponding through letters and postcards. 47
Throughout early 2006, Pendleton made occasional visits to Dieter at
his group home. 48 In the summer of 2006, Pendleton invited Dieter to go
on an overnight biking and camping trip with him. 49 Dieter agreed. 50 On
the second night of the trip, while Pendleton and Dieter were in their shared
tent, Pendleton initiated sexual contact with Dieter.51 Dieter pushed
Pendleton away and ran out of the tent.52 Dieter went to the campsite
manager’s home, and the manager called Dieter’s custodians, who picked
him up and took him back to the group home. 53 Until Pendleton was tried,
Dieter’s only subsequent contact with Pendleton was a letter that Dieter
received. 54
41

18 U.S.C. § 2423(c); United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111, 2009 WL 330965, at *1
(D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009).
42
Transcript of Record at 1, 336–38, United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111 (D. Del.
Jan. 20, 2010).
43
See generally id.
44
News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Delaware Child Predator
Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison: The Man Was Convicted by a Jury on Sex Tourism
and Failure to Register Charges (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/1002/100204wilmington.htm [hereinafter Delaware Child Predator Sentenced].
45
Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 96–97. Although the victim had turned
eighteen by the time of his testimony, I have chosen to use a pseudonym in this Comment for
privacy purposes.
46
Id. at 92.
47
Id. at 99. Dieter testified that he thought it was “exciting” to get postcards from
Pendleton. Id. at 108. He said he received postcards depicting Rockefeller Place in New
York and Independence Hall in Philadelphia, among other landmarks. Id.
48
Id. at 99.
49
Id. at 108–09.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 115–18.
52
Id. at 120.
53
Id. at 126, 130.
54
Id. at 130–31. Police found what was presumably a draft of the letter, dated May 29,
2006, on Pendleton’s computer when he was arrested. It read, in part:
My Dear Dieter: I need to write to you to express my great sorrow and sadness that my
thoughtless and insensitive actions have caused you so much pain. What I had intended to be a
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Pendleton argued in pretrial proceedings that the noncommercial prong
of § 2423(c) was “facially unconstitutional because it exceeds congressional
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.” 55 Pendleton’s arguments were unavailing. 56 The Pendleton
district court found that § 2423(c) was well within Congress’s power to
regulate foreign commerce. 57 Pendleton was convicted at the subsequent
jury trial. 58 Relying heavily on Pendleton’s prior convictions for sexually
abusing children, the district court judge sentenced Pendleton to the
statutory maximum of thirty years in prison and a lifetime of supervised
release. 59 On appeal to the Third Circuit, Pendleton again attacked the
constitutionality of the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). 60 On September
7, 2011, the Third Circuit upheld § 2423(c) and affirmed Pendleton’s
conviction. 61
Pendleton’s case—though clearly a distressing example of child sex
exploitation—seems relatively unremarkable upon initial examination.
According to Department of Justice statistics, he was one of 1,916 suspects
arrested in the same reporting year for nonviolent sex offenses. 62 Even the
gesture and action to signify a friendship and love was carried too far and clearly shocked and
frightened you. This result is the exact opposite of what I had intended, which was to reassure
you of my feelings for you and to help deepen the bond between us, as well as to relax you and
make you feel better and more comfortable . . . . I conclude by repeating how sorry I am that I
have been the cause of such pain, and that I hope you can get over this, to recover and to be
strengthened by the experience and that sometime you will be able to forgive me and accept me
as your friend, loving and trustworthy. With deep regret but with real hope, your once and future
friend.

Id. at 271–74.
55
United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *2 (D. Del. Feb.
11, 2009).
56
Id. at *6.
57
Id. at *3–4; see infra text accompanying notes 107–109, 122–125.
58
United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011).
59
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006). Pendleton has a long and unsympathetic history of
sexually abusing young boys. Delaware Child Predator Sentenced, supra note 44. In 1981,
he was convicted by a Michigan court for molesting an eleven-year-old while serving as a
church camp counselor. Id. In a 1992 New Jersey case, he was convicted of sexual assault,
attempted aggravated sexual assault of a minor, and endangering the welfare of a child in a
case involving sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old boy on biking trips in Virginia and New
Jersey. Id. In 2001, he was convicted by the government of the Republic of Latvia of
sexually abusing both a nine-year-old child and a thirteen-year-old child over the span of six
months. Id.
60
Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 302.
61
Id. at 311.
62
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2008—STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.1 (2010), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/
fjsst/2008/fjs08st.pdf. A nonviolent sex offense includes, inter alia, “transporting an
individual (including minors) from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce
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result is unsurprising—95.6% of nonviolent sex offense cases terminated in
the same reporting year as Pendleton’s resulted in convictions. 63 There was
minimal media coverage of Pendleton’s trial and conviction. Yet
Pendleton’s case was significant because it presented the first opportunity
for federal appellate review of the constitutionality of the noncommercial
prong of § 2423(c), potentially setting the stage for Supreme Court review
of the issue. 64
C. ANALYZING THE DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Foreign Commerce Clause is part of Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” 65 This clause actually contains three concepts: the Foreign
Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”), the
Interstate Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States”), and the Indian Commerce Clause (“[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes”).
The Foreign Commerce Clause is largely unexplored territory for
with the intent and purpose of engaging in prostitution, or any sexual activity for which any
person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Id. at 64.
63
MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009—
STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.4.2 (2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09
st.pdf. Of those who went to trial, sixty-two were convicted and only four were acquitted.
Id.
64
Other defendants have been charged under the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), but
most of them have pleaded guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1259
(9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Prowler, 320 F. App’x 721, 721 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Castellon, 213 F. App’x 732, 733 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bollea, 144 F.
App’x 69, 70 (11th Cir. 2005). At least one defendant has been convicted under this prong,
but he has not appealed his sentence. See United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784,
803 (W.D. Tex. 2009). Reviewing Pendleton would also give the Supreme Court the
opportunity to address a second important issue concerning prosecutions of citizens’
overseas conduct—which criminal venue statute should be used in such cases. The Second
and Ninth Circuits refuse to apply 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (which applies to offenses not
committed in any U.S. judicial district) unless the offense charged was committed entirely
outside of the United States. See United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982). The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
apply § 3238 where some conduct occurs in the United States and some conduct occurs
overseas. Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 305; United States v. Levy Auto Parts, 787 F.2d 946, 950,
952 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1979). This
circuit split implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights to have his trial “held in the State
where the said crimes shall have been committed” and to be heard by a “jury of the state and
the district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 & amend.
VI, and deserves attention from the Supreme Court.
65
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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jurists and commentators, 66 especially relative to its cousin, the Interstate
Commerce Clause. However, as travel between the United States and
foreign nations becomes a frequent reality for more and more U.S. citizens,
the extent of the U.S. government’s authority to criminalize the activities of
citizens abroad takes on increasing importance. 67 Cases attacking the
constitutionality of § 2423(b) and (c) present an ideal opportunity to explore
the constitutional justification for criminal legislation explicitly designed to
apply extraterritorially. Most challenges to § 2423(b) and (c) have invoked
the Foreign Commerce Clause. 68 Defendants often argue that these
criminal provisions fall outside of Congress’s constitutional authority “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” 69
No clear test exists for evaluating the constitutionality of criminal laws
passed pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority. 70 Out
of the murkiness, it is possible to discern three general analytical
frameworks. First, some courts have relied on Interstate Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and applied the tests articulated in United States v. Lopez and
its progeny to the Foreign Commerce Clause context.71 Those courts treat
the United States and the relevant foreign nation as sister-states and
consider whether the statute would be a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power in the interstate context.72 If the statute would
66

Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 950
(2010) (“[T]he Foreign Commerce Clause has received little sustained analytical
attention.”); Julie Buffington, Comment, Taking the Ball and Running with It: U.S. v. Clark
and Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
841, 842 (2006).
67
Colangelo, supra note 66, at 951. Indeed, as Professor Colangelo notes, recent hubbub
regarding the Foreign Commerce Clause has led to a spate of student notes and comments
analyzing the case of Michael Clark, see United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir.
2006), and making tentative forays into analyses of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id. at
949, 951 n.5. Perhaps Professor Colangelo’s expansive article on the history, doctrinal
development, and current application of the Foreign Commerce Clause is the best evidence
of the increasing importance of the Foreign Commerce Clause to assessing the
constitutionality of congressional action.
68
See supra note 40.
69
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70
See infra text accompanying notes 82–147; see also Buffington, supra note 66, at 846
(“[N]o clear guidelines for determining the constitutionality of a statute that restricts a U.S.
citizen’s conduct in foreign commerce have emerged.”). This lack of clarity applies only to
Congress’s positive authority; the proper test for evaluating whether state action violates the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is well settled, but extensive discussion thereof is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434
(1979).
71
See, e.g., United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 805–09 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
72
See, e.g., Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 805–09.
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survive constitutional scrutiny in that instance, it survives constitutional
scrutiny under this approach to Foreign Commerce Clause interpretation.73
The second analytical framework also starts with Interstate Commerce
Clause case law, but it is heavily influenced by dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 74 Courts that apply this framework find that
precedential treatment of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause—which
concerns the states’ authority to regulate foreign commerce in the absence
of federal action—gives Congress “broad and plenary” authority to legislate
in the foreign commerce arena. 75 Because these courts have found that
Congress’s power is greater under the Foreign Commerce Clause than the
Interstate Commerce Clause, 76 they may be more inclined to find that
§ 2423(b) and (c) are valid enactments, even if a strict application of Lopez
and its progeny would not support such a finding in the interstate context.
The third analytical framework also starts with Lopez. Instead of
combining Lopez with dormant Foreign Commerce Clause case law,
however, the commentators and individual judges77 whose analyses fall into
this third category combine Lopez with sovereignty and international law
concerns in arriving at their Foreign Commerce Clause tests.78 Proponents
of this approach have found that the scope of Congress’s Foreign
Commerce Clause authority is narrower than the scope of its Interstate
Commerce Clause authority. 79 Thus, they would examine statutes
purporting to criminalize citizens’ conduct abroad more stringently than
they would statutes regulating interstate behavior. 80 This Comment
ultimately argues that a version of this third analytical framework is the
most appropriate test for considering a criminal statute’s constitutionality
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.81
1. First Analytical Framework: The Lopez Categories
All three of the analytical frameworks that courts and commentators
have used to assess Foreign Commerce Clause cases rely, at their core, on
the currently reigning Interstate Commerce Clause test. In order for a
73

Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205; Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 805–09.
See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453–54 (considering the constitutionality of a state statute
purporting to regulate foreign commerce).
75
United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3–4 (D. Del. Feb.
11, 2009) (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006)).
76
See, e.g., Pendleton, 2009 WL 330965, at *6; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1111, 1113, 1116.
77
No U.S. district court or U.S. court of appeals majority has applied this framework.
78
See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66; Buffington, supra note 66.
79
See infra Part II.C.3.
80
See infra Part II.C.3.
81
See infra Part III.A.
74
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statute to be within Congress’s Interstate Commerce Clause powers, it must
regulate one of the “three broad categories of activity” set forth in United
States v. Lopez: (1) “the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce”; or (3) “those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.” 82 Further, the conduct that the
statute at issue seeks to regulate must be economic in nature.83
A number of courts have directly applied this Interstate Commerce
Clause test to cases decided under the Foreign Commerce Clause by
treating the United States and the relevant foreign nation as if they were
sister-states. 84 For example, in United States v. Bredimus, the defendant
traveled from Texas to Thailand, via Hong Kong and Tokyo, in 2001.85 His
trip had a dual purpose: first, to attend scheduled business meetings, and
second, to “make videotapes and digital images of Thai children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct.” 86
The defendant was indicted under § 2423(b) and moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause by enacting § 2423(b).87 The Bredimus district court
denied the defendant’s motion, finding that § 2423(b) “[did] not exceed
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because Congress has the
authority to keep the channels of foreign commerce free from immoral or
injurious uses.” 88 In affirming, the Fifth Circuit, relying on Lopez and
Morrison, observed that other courts have upheld statutes similar to
§ 2423(b) on a “channels of commerce” theory. 89
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas has
also applied Interstate Commerce Clause precedent in the Foreign
Commerce Clause context. In United States v. Martinez, the twenty-year82

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
84
E.g., United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 204–06 (5th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790–91 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
85
Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 202.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 203.
89
Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 207–08. The Fifth Circuit noted, but did not rely on, its opinion
that “the deference accorded to Congress [is] more compelling when, as here, the commerce
at issue is foreign, as opposed to interstate.” Id. The court referred to United States v. Von
Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)); United States
v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)); and United
States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)).
The Third Circuit panel that decided United States v. Pendleton also upheld § 2423(c)
against a Foreign Commerce Clause challenge on the “channels of commerce” theory. 658
F.3d 299, 308–11 (3d Cir. 2011).
83
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old defendant took a minor girl from her aunt’s house, led her on foot
across a bridge from El Paso, Texas, to Juarez, Mexico, and forced her to
have sex with him. 90 The defendant was indicted for, inter alia,
“[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c).” 91
The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that
§ 2423(c) was unconstitutional because it was outside the scope of
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority. 92 The Western District of
Texas held that § 2423(c) passed constitutional muster.93 Instead of relying
on the “channels of commerce” theory that the Bredimus court applied, the
Martinez court relied on the “substantially affects” prong of Lopez. 94 It
found that there was “a rational basis for concluding that leaving noncommercial sex with minors outside of federal control could affect the price
for child prostitution services and other market conditions in the child
prostitution industry.” 95
Not all judges who have considered the constitutionality of the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) under this analytical framework
concluded that it is constitutional. Judge Roth dissented from the portion of
the majority opinion in United States v. Bianchi upholding § 2423(c)
against a Commerce Clause challenge. Applying Lopez, he opined that
“criminalizing non-commercial activity abroad exceeds Congress’s power
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.” 96 Judge Roth found that there was
“no rational basis to conclude that an illicit sex act with a minor undertaken
on foreign soil, perhaps years after legal travel and devoid of any exchange
of value, substantially affects foreign commerce.” 97 By removing the intent
requirement in the 2003 amendments to § 2423(b), Congress “severed any
jurisdictional tie to the prohibited activity.” 98 “Vesting Congress with such
a general international police power,” Judge Roth reasoned, “would violate
both [the defendant’s] constitutional rights and the limited nature of our
federal government.” 99
90

United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 790–91 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
Id. at 791.
92
Id. at 791–92.
93
Id. at 808.
94
Id.
95
Id. The Martinez court noted in a throwaway comment that federal courts have given
Congress “almost complete deference” when “enacting laws regulating foreign commerce,”
but did not appear to rely on the expanded authority the way other courts have. Id.
96
United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (Roth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 164.
99
Id.
91
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In sum, courts that graft the Lopez framework directly onto the Foreign
Commerce Clause analysis do two things: First, they determine whether the
conduct regulated fits within one of Lopez’s definitions of “commerce.”
Then, they consider whether there is a rational basis to believe that the
statute actually does regulate one of the three categories of “commerce.”
Some courts have used this framework to uphold § 2423(b) and (c) against
facial challenges.100 It is also the basis for the two alternative analytical
approaches described infra. Both use the Lopez Interstate Commerce
Clause test as a jumping-off point for their respective Foreign Commerce
Clause tests.
2. Second Analytical Framework: Combining Lopez with Dormant
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence to Justify Increased Congressional
Authority Under the Foreign Commerce Clause
Some courts have found that Congress’s power to regulate conduct
under the Foreign Commerce Clause is greater than its power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause. 101 The reasoning behind this approach is
relatively consistent across the courts that apply it. The analysis usually
involves at least two of the following three arguments: First, the commerce
power is separated into three distinct sections—the Interstate Commerce
Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause—
and there is little intrasentence unity in the constitutional phrasing. 102
Second, the original intent of the Framers was to grant Congress broader
authority in regulating foreign commerce than interstate commerce, because
the unique federalist concerns of the fledgling nation limited the federal
government’s authority only vis-à-vis the states. 103 Finally, the courts
consider as binding authority a long and relatively settled line of dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons v. Ogden through Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, which tend to suggest that Congress has
broad power. 104

100

See id. at 156; United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2003); Martinez,
599 F. Supp. 2d at 784; see also Buffington, supra note 66, at 846 & n.38 (collecting cases).
101
See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009).
102
See, e.g., Nicholas Christophilos, Comment, Constitutional Law—Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003—Congress
Did Not Exceed Its Constitutional Authority by Criminalizing Commercial Sex Abroad—
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 515,
518 (2007).
103
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1102–03.
104
See, e.g., id.
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Textual Interpretation

Scholars debate the notion of intrasentence uniformity—the idea that
words and phrases connected to each other in the Constitution ought to be
interpreted in a way that is consistent with each other. 105 Courts and
commentators who find that the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
Interstate Commerce Clause call for different tests believe that the
Commerce Clause sets forth three distinct powers, each with its own unique
meaning: “Though each clause is controlled by the same introductory
phrase, the Framers appear to have considered the individual commerce
powers—foreign, interstate, and Indian—as distinct subclauses, requiring
separate analysis.” 106
For example, en route to finding that the noncommercial prong of
§ 2423(c) was a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional authority, the
Third Circuit observed in Pendleton that the Foreign Commerce Clause has
“followed its own distinct evolutionary path.” 107 Deciding that the
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause encapsulate
different congressional powers allows advocates of this second analytical
framework to decide that the “Foreign Commerce Clause is different from
the Interstate Commerce Clause,” and therefore to move away from the
Lopez framework. 108 This belief allows courts to place fewer limits on
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority than on its Interstate
Commerce Clause authority. 109
ii. Original Intent—Federalism and the Need for One National Voice
The courts and commentators who apply this second analytical
framework also believe that the original intent of the Framers was to grant
Congress broader authority in regulating foreign commerce than in
regulating interstate commerce because of the unique federalist concerns of
the early United States. This belief has some basis in Supreme Court
jurisprudence: “Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress
power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several
105

Id. at 1110 (collecting scholarly articles). See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Our
Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV.
1149 (2003).
106
Daniel Bolia, Comment, Policing Americans Abroad: The PROTECT Act, the Case
Against Michael Lewis Clark, and the Use of the Foreign Commerce Clause in an
Increasingly Flat World, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 797, 804 (2007).
107
United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Clark, 435 F.3d
at 1113).
108
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1110–11.
109
Id. at 1111 (“[T]he Supreme Court has read the Foreign Commerce Clause as granting
Congress sweeping powers.”).
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States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the
scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.” 110
The thrust of this argument is that Foreign Commerce Clause cases are
free from the “[f]ederalism and state sovereignty concerns” that led courts
to limit Congress’s authority to pass laws pursuant to its Interstate
Commerce Clause power. 111 In other words, Interstate Commerce Clause
cases implicate the argument that the continued existence of the federal
system depends upon “some appraisal and accommodation of the
competing demands of the state and national interests involved.” 112 Foreign
Commerce Clause cases lack these federalism concerns; therefore, these
courts and commentators argue, the rationale behind restricting federal
power in the interstate context simply does not apply in the Foreign
Commerce Clause domain. 113
Further, proponents of this second analytical framework often draw on
a related originalist argument that the Framers intended Congress’s
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause to be far-reaching so that the
United States could speak with one voice in foreign affairs. One
commentator sought to prove that “the Founders intended Congress to
have—and the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as
providing—broader powers in the realm of foreign commerce than in
commerce between the states.” 114 He argued for increased congressional
authority in foreign affairs because the Constitution emerged, in part, out of
a need for a uniform, federal voice to speak for the new nation in issues
involving commerce with foreign nations.115 Ultimately, the argument
goes, the result of combining the Interstate Commerce Clause test with the
absence of federalism concerns and “the necessity that the nation speak
with one voice” is that “any statute that would be granted constitutional
deference when it regulates interstate commerce is accorded even greater
deference when Congress is regulating foreign commerce.”116
iii. Doctrinal Development of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
Courts and authors in this second framework have also analyzed
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence and concluded that it
110

Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (citing, inter alia, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279–83 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
111
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Bolia, supra note 106, at 802–03.
115
Id. at 803.
116
United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 805 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (citing United
States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003)).
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supports the proposition that Congress has broad authority to regulate in the
foreign commerce arena.
The Supreme Court’s dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause jurisprudence dates back to 1824 and Gibbons v. Ogden,
which held that the Foreign Commerce Clause “comprehend[s] every
species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations.” 117
Later courts put flesh on the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
skeleton articulated by Gibbons, most notably in Japan Line. 118 Japan Line
considered whether a state tax could be imposed on instrumentalities of
foreign commerce. 119 The County of Los Angeles argued that the
Commerce Clause analysis should be identical regardless of whether the
commerce at issue was foreign or interstate. 120 The Supreme Court
considered and explicitly rejected that argument, finding that “[w]hen
construing Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’
a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”121
A number of courts, including the Pendleton district court, have relied
on Japan Line to support giving even more deference to Congress when it
legislates pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause than when it legislates
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.122 The Pendleton district court
first noted that “Congress is authorized to regulate the . . . three broad
categories of activity” that are sketched out in Lopez. 123 It then cited Japan
Line for the proposition that “Congress’ power to regulate foreign
commerce, however, is even greater than its power to regulate interstate
commerce.” 124 Without identifying a specific Lopez category that the
conduct addressed in § 2423(c) would fall under, the Court concluded that
under this “broad and plenary” Foreign Commerce Clause power, the
element that a defendant travel in foreign commerce placed the statute
“‘squarely within Congress’ authority to regulate and protect’ Foreign
117

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824).
See Japan Line Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see also Buffington, supra
note 66, at 843–46.
119
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434.
120
Id. at 446.
121
Id. The Japan Line Court held that when a state sought to tax the instrumentalities of
foreign commerce, two additional considerations—besides the usual constitutional issues—
come into play: (1) “the enhanced risk of multiple taxation”; and (2) the fact that “[f]oreign
commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern” and “a state tax on the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential.” Id. at 446–48.
122
United States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *3–4 (D. Del.
Feb. 11, 2009).
123
Id. at *3.
124
Id. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434).
118

2013] THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(C)

967

Commerce.” 125
The clearest example of the application of this second analytical
framework is the Eastern District of Wisconsin’s recent decision in United
States v. Flath. 126 The Flath court briefly acknowledged that Congress’s
powers over “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States” are contained in the same constitutional provision, but noted that the
two powers have “significant distinctions.” 127 Most importantly, “the
interplay of federalism and state sovereignty, so prevalent in the interstate
commerce context, is absent in the foreign commerce arena.”128 Further,
the Flath court relied on Japan Line to find that “Congress has broader
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations than among states.” 129
After making these initial observations, the court considered the Lopez
categories and found that “the use of the channels and instrumentalities of
foreign commerce is necessarily a part of the commission of the targeted
That finding, combined with
offense,” contained in § 2423(c). 130
“Congress’s broader power to regulate foreign commerce than interstate
commerce and the absence of federalism and state sovereignty
considerations,” led the Flath court to find that § 2423(c) “is a proper
regulation of persons in foreign commerce and of the uses of the channels
of foreign commerce under Congress’s foreign commerce power.” 131
3. Third Analytical Framework: Combining Lopez with Constraining
Originalist and Foreign Sovereignty Arguments to Restrict
Congressional Authority
Some commentators and individual judges—but no district courts or
appellate majorities—have found that Congress’s power to legislate
pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause is not as expansive as its power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.132 This approach tends to include
one or more of the following characteristics: First, there is a textual
argument that the language of the Commerce Clause—which regulates
commerce “with” foreign nations but “among” the states—contemplates
different approaches to assessing congressional authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause, respectively. 133
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at *3–4 (citing United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006)).
United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
Id. at 954–55.
Id. at 955.
Id. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
Id.
Id. at 956–57.
See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66, at 969–70; Buffington, supra note 66, at 857–58.
Colangelo, supra note 66, at 954.
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Second, the application of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to positive Foreign Commerce Clause cases is inapposite
because of the starkly different factual scenarios presented by the two types
of statutes. 134 Relatedly, norms of international sovereignty require a
greater restriction of Congress’s authority to criminalize conduct occurring
in a foreign locale than norms of federalism require when criminalizing
conduct occurring in the United States.135
i.

Textual Interpretation

Proponents of this third analytical approach do not believe that
commerce takes on a different meaning depending on its referent (foreign
Nations, several States, or Indian Tribes). Instead, they ascribe a consistent
meaning to “commerce,” and therefore use the Lopez framework to define
the three categories of commerce regulated by the Commerce Clause as a
whole 136:
Whatever the meaning of “commerce,” it presumably has the same meaning whether
that commerce takes place “among the states” or occurs “with foreign nations.”
Likewise, the power to “regulate” commerce among the states presumptively is the
same power that Congress has to “regulate” commerce with Indian tribes. Indeed, one
might say that there is only one power—the power to regulate commerce—that
137
applies to three situations.

Instead of focusing on the differences between types of “commerce” or
“regulat[ion],” the emphasis in this framework is on the differences
between the words “among” and “with.” 138 The fact that the Framers of the
Constitution switched from “with” to “among” when talking about foreign
nations and the states, respectively, indicates that the former is meant to
allow Congress to regulate activity between the United States and foreign
nations, not activity among other foreign nations or in foreign nations.139

134

Id. at 953.
See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 66, at 953 (“The Foreign Commerce Clause . . . raises
not only novel and pressing doctrinal questions, but also serious normative issues that
habitually attend the unilateral projection of domestic law abroad by escalating the potential
for both international friction and unfairness to individuals.”); Joanna Doerfel, Comment,
Regulating Unsettled Issues in Latin America Under the Treaty Powers and the Foreign
Commerce Clause, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 331, 349 (2008).
136
Colangelo, supra note 66, at 986.
137
Prakash, supra note 105, at 1149.
138
Colangelo, supra note 66, at 970–71.
139
See id. Professor Colangelo argues that the word “with” requires that there be a
“nexus” between the conduct criminalized and the United States. If a statute meets that
requirement, falls into one of the Lopez categories, and respects foreign sovereignty norms, it
is valid under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id. at 954–55.
135
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ii. Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
This analytical framework does not ignore or dispute the authority of
the long line of cases establishing the federal government’s dominance in
the area of foreign commerce.140 Rather, commentators argue that those
cases are inapposite because they are interpretations of the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause; thus, they address only the states’ inability to regulate
commerce with foreign nations (and Congress’s ability to curtail attempted
exercises of such authority), not Congress’s constitutional authority to
affirmatively regulate conduct. 141 Lower courts have “cherry-pick[ed]”
statements by the Supreme Court extolling the broad power of Congress in
the foreign commerce context and, without considering whether the
respective rationales behind the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and
positive Foreign Commerce Clause are consistent, used those quotations to
uphold statutes that may actually violate the Foreign Commerce Clause. 142
The rationale behind the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases—
that in revenue and international trade cases, federal authority must trump
state authority—“do[es] not exist in the context of the illicit sex acts
statute . . . . [T]hus, Congress should not have the same discretion to
regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens or aliens who travel in foreign
commerce.” 143 As one commentator put it:
[I]t makes sense for Congress to have broad power to regulate foreign trade and the
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce because of international relations
concerns. . . . [I]t is arguably not as important for Congress to act in a unified manner
in regulating the illicit sex acts of a U.S. citizen abroad because this conduct can be
144
regulated . . . by the foreign nation in which the crime occurs.

In other words, because the Foreign Commerce Clause cases that give
broad latitude to the federal government arise almost exclusively in the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context, they are inapplicable when
considering whether the Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress the
positive authority to pass criminal statutes. 145
Finally, an individual’s overseas conduct—no matter how
despicable—simply “does not give rise to the same foreign relations
concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in Japan Line,” and “Congress
140

Id. at 959–69.
Id.
142
Id. at 957.
143
Buffington, supra note 66, at 857.
144
Id. at 858.
145
United States v. Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355–56 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[I]ts [sic] is
not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”) (citing Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).
141
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should not have broader power to enact a Foreign Commerce Clause statute
regulating a U.S. citizen’s criminal conduct abroad than it has in regulating
the citizen’s interstate conduct.” 146 A related argument proffered for
constraining congressional authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause is
that “[i]ntrusions into the realm of other sovereigns must be legitimate
exercises of power and must be taken with the utmost consideration toward
the situs nation.” With respect to § 2423(c), at least one commentator has
argued, “Congress encroached upon the realm of another sovereign.” 147
III. DISCUSSION
Having reviewed the background of the noncommercial prong of
§ 2423(c) and the current, varied approaches to analyzing statutes under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, the next step is to determine whether the
Foreign Commerce Clause—or any other constitutional grant of authority to
Congress—allows courts to enforce, consistent with the U.S. Constitution,
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). 148 Part A argues that when courts
are considering the constitutionality of statutes passed pursuant to
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power, they should ask not only
whether the statute regulates “commerce,” as defined by the Court’s
Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also whether such
commerce is “with” a foreign nation. Part A concludes that the Foreign
Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to pass the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).
Part B argues that Congress’s power to pass legislation to enforce U.S.
treaty obligations may give Congress the authority to pass the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). Part C then argues that, in the event
that neither the Foreign Commerce Clause nor Congress’s power to pass
laws implementing treaties provides a constitutional justification for the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), prosecutors have new tools and trial
strategies that make convictions under § 2423(b) more likely, such that
§ 2423(b) has become an effective—and constitutionally sound—
alternative to § 2423(c).

146

Buffington, supra note 66, at 858.
Doerfel, supra note 135, at 349.
148
“Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers
enumerated in the Constitution.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution
is written.”).
147
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A. CRAFTING A FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE TEST FOR § 2423(C)

The Supreme Court should consent to review United States v.
Pendleton, or a similar case, in order to provide definitive guidance to lower
courts considering the extent of Congress’s power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. As explained below, this Comment finds the analytical
framework described supra in Part II.C.3 most persuasive, but even under a
straightforward application of the Lopez test, as modified by subsequent
cases, the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) fails a Commerce Clause
challenge. This Part first explains why the combination of § 2323(c) and
(f)(1) does not regulate commerce under currently reigning Supreme Court
jurisprudence. It then briefly explores why the fact that Congress is
operating in the foreign, rather than the interstate, context supports a
narrower interpretation of Congress’s commerce power.
Like all courts that have addressed the constitutionality of § 2423(c),
this Comment starts by examining whether the statute regulates commerce
as defined by Lopez and subsequent cases. 149 Congress can pass statutes
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority if there is a rational basis for
concluding that the legislation regulates one of the three categories of
commerce laid out in Lopez—(1) the channels of commerce, (2) the
instrumentalities of commerce, or (3) intrastate activity that has a
substantial effect on commerce. 150 The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c)
does not regulate an instrumentality of commerce. An instrumentality of
commerce is something that facilitates interstate commerce, such as a
train, 151 a ship, 152 or a cargo container.153 Section 2423(c) regulates
individuals’ conduct, not the planes or boats that transport those
individuals.
Section 2423(c) also does not regulate a channel of commerce. The
channels of commerce are “the interstate transportation routes through
which persons and goods move,” including highways, railroads, navigable

149

There is a great deal of common sense behind interpreting like words in a like fashion
and different words in a different fashion. Prakash, supra note 105, at 1149. Therefore, this
Comment takes the approach that “commerce” should be given the same definition across
the three parts of the Commerce Clause—the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate
Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. This has the added benefit of giving
lower courts ample Supreme Court guidance as they undertake their constitutional
analyses—there is no need to reinvent the Commerce Clause wheel in response to the
growing importance of the Foreign Commerce Clause.
150
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000).
151
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877).
152
Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1878).
153
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1979).

972

JESSICA E. NOTEBAERT

[Vol. 103

waters, and airspace. 154 It has been argued that because § 2423(c) requires
a defendant to travel in foreign commerce, it clearly regulates a channel of
commerce. 155 But § 2423(c) does not truly purport to regulate passage on
international flights; it purports to regulate citizens’ sexual conduct
abroad. 156 Section 2423(c) is distinguishable from statutes that regulate the
use of the channels of commerce for injurious purposes because under those
statutes, the channels of commerce either are used in the commission of the
offense 157 or are used with a criminal purpose in mind. 158 Neither of those
conditions is present in § 2423(c).
Indeed, if courts upheld § 2423(c) under a “channels of commerce”
framework solely because at some point—perhaps years or decades before
committing a criminal act—an offender traveled in foreign commerce,
Congress could criminalize essentially any action by anyone who travels to
a foreign country. Congress could criminalize overseas traffic violations,
jaywalking, drug use, or virtually any other conduct by U.S. citizens if the
only jurisdictional hook required was that the defendant first traveled from
the United States to a foreign country. 159 The Commerce Clause does not
grant such extensive power. 160 Further, such broad legislative power raises
154

United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613); see also Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003)
(upholding legislation “aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce,” including
streets, roads, and federal highways); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508, 518 (1941) (recognizing that navigable waters, railroads, and highways are
“channels of commerce,” which can be regulated under Congress’s commerce powers).
155
See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2011).
156
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006).
157
See, e.g., id. § 2421 (criminalizing knowingly transporting an individual in interstate
or foreign commerce with the intent that the transported individual engage in prostitution).
158
See, e.g., id. §§ 1341 (criminalizing the use of the mail “for the purpose of executing”
a criminal scheme or artifice), 2423(b) (criminalizing traveling in interstate or foreign
commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct”). The Committee on
Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit appears to have read § 2423(c) to
contain a requirement that the defendant travel with a criminal purpose in mind; it
characterized the offense as “the defendant . . . traveling in foreign commerce to engage in
illicit sexual conduct with a minor.” 7th Cir. PJI, supra note 36, at 635 (emphasis added).
But this essentially adds back into the statute the intent element that the PROTECT Act
deliberately removed, see supra Part II.A, and this one reading of the statute cannot save it.
159
See United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) (Roth, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Because Congress severed any jurisdictional tie
to the prohibited activity, it is untenable to use the travel element of section 2423(c) to
shoehorn a subsequent, unconnected crime into the category of activities that substantially
affect foreign commerce.”); cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (2000) (“[I]f Congress may
regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of
violence . . . .”).
160
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[U]nlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct

2013] THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(C)

973

policy concerns related not only to the appropriate reach of U.S. authority
but also to the related concern of maintaining respect for foreign states’
sovereignty within their borders.
The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) cannot satisfy the
“substantially affects” prong of Lopez either. Under the substantially
affects prong, Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” 161 As discussed in Part II.C.1, at least one
court 162 used this theory to uphold § 2423(c) on the ground that the effect of
child sex abuse on the market for child prostitution (i.e., the idea that if a
“consumer” of child sex abuse obtains his desired good for free, the entire
commercial market is affected) is analogous to the effect of private wheat
production on the highly regulated wheat market 163 or of private marijuana
production on the illegal marijuana market. 164
The substantially affects prong, as developed in Raich, has certainly
expanded Congress’s power to regulate commerce, but it did not render that
power unlimited. 165 Child sex abuse is not an economic commodity
equivalent to wheat or marijuana. The Wickard Court acknowledged that
the problem with a farmer’s production of wheat for individual
consumption is that he “forestall[s] resort to the market,” thus removing a
potential purchaser from the supply–demand equation. 166 Likewise, the
Raich Court approved Congress’s regulation of home-grown marijuana
because marijuana is “a fungible commodity for which there is an
established, albeit illegal, interstate market,” and “leaving home-consumed
marijuana outside federal control would . . . affect price and market
conditions.” 167
But child sex abuse is not a commodity that is typically purchased on
has a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an
evident commercial nexus. . . . In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours
has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce
power may reach so far.”).
161
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
128–29 (1942).
162
Cf. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 808 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
163
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29.
164
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18–19.
165
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); cf. National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–91 (2012) (articulating limits on
Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
166
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127; see id. at 128 (“[Home-grown wheat] supplies a need of the
man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.
Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.”).
167
Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
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the open market; there is no similar tradeoff in which if individual
production is regulated, the consumer is forced to participate in a
commercial market that can be controlled by the federal government. Most
child sex abuse is perpetrated by children’s family members and close
acquaintances, 168 not anonymous purchasers. Criminalizing the abuse of
children does not encourage abusers to start engaging in market activity,
such as paying providers of child prostitutes, that can be regulated as a
commercial enterprise. It just prohibits private, noneconomic activity that
occurs wholly outside the markets. 169 Thus, the noncommercial prong of
§ 2423(c) is similar to the provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) that was struck down in United States v. Morrison.170 The
statutory provision at issue in Morrison penalized engaging in gendermotivated violence.171 In striking down that law as an impermissible
extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, the Morrison Court
held that Congress cannot “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 172
The activity prohibited by the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) is of the
same noneconomic, criminal character as the activity regulated by VAWA,
and since VAWA could not satisfy the substantially affects prong of Lopez,
§ 2423(c) cannot either.
Although the foregoing analysis explains why the noncommercial
prong of § 2423(c) is unconstitutional under the Interstate Commerce
Clause test, there are good reasons why courts should adopt a slightly
modified (and stricter) test for statutes that purport to regulate activity
pursuant to Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause authority. In particular,
there is a persuasive textual argument that the Framers’ choice to regulate
commerce “with” foreign nations but “among” the states gives different
meanings to the respective clauses.173
The plain definitions of “with” and “among” seem to support
commentators’ arguments that the different word choices signal different

168

See Thomas Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1203–04 & n.4 (2012) (collecting sources).
169
Cf. Cortney Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 392 (2013) (“Intrafamily sexual abuse occurs without regard to the
market.”).
170
529 U.S. at 617 (holding that Congress’s commerce power did not grant it the power
to pass 18 U.S.C. § 13981).
171
Id. at 601–02, 605–06.
172
Id.; see also id. at 613.
173
It is worth noting that the statutory definition of “foreign commerce” in the Criminal
Code also highlights the importance of the word “with.” The term “foreign commerce,” per
statute, means “commerce with a foreign country.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (emphasis added).

2013] THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(C)

975

constitutional standards. 174 “With” is “a function word” used “to indicate a
participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement.” 175 “Among” means
“by or through the aggregate of” or “through the joint action of.” 176
“Among” by definition implicates the aggregate activity of sister-states, but
“with” has no such denotation. These definitions suggest that Congress’s
power to regulate in the foreign context is narrower than in the interstate
context because Congress cannot base its authority on an argument that a
foreign nation’s intracountry activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects
foreign commerce. If the aggregate of noneconomic intracountry activity in
a foreign nation falls outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, a
statute passed pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause is only valid if it
regulates the instrumentalities or channels of foreign commerce. This
limitation seriously curtails Congress’s authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause and makes it even clearer that § 2423(c) exceeds
congressional authority.
The original intent and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause arguments
discussed supra Part II.C provide additional support for the conclusion
reached by the textual analysis—that the “best” Foreign Commerce Clause
test is an adaptation of the Interstate Commerce Clause test as constrained
by the language of the Foreign Commerce Clause. The Foreign Commerce
Clause was initially proposed and included in the Constitution to allow
Congress to regulate trade with foreign nations and to prevent the states
from developing inconsistent foreign trade policies that harmed the status of
the developing United States in foreign affairs.177 But there is no indication
in the early history or subsequent interpretations of the Foreign Commerce
Clause that the Framers or early jurists intended Congress to have greater
power to regulate under the Foreign Commerce Clause than the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 178
Further, there is no principled rationale for relying on Japan Line and
other dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases to support an argument that
Congress has plenary power to regulate pursuant to the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 179 Those cases reflect the unique federalist quality of governance in
the United States; Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce is broad
when compared to the power of the states to regulate foreign commerce. 180
But that argument cannot be used to argue that Congress’s Foreign
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See supra note 139.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1438 (11th ed. 2011).
Id. at 41.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–147.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–147.
See supra Part II.C.2.iii.
Id.
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Commerce Clause power is virtually unlimited, as courts have mistakenly
done. 181 Where Congress acts to negate state action (in the case of the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause), the typical federalist concerns arise
and, as in the interstate context, Congress’s power trumps state power. But
when Congress acts in a positive manner, by passing laws that regulate
overseas conduct, it runs into a different constraint on power—the
sovereignty of foreign nations. 182 Concern that congressional action may
infringe on other nations’ autonomy makes it good policy to ensure that
Congress’s power is carefully limited according to the Constitution.
Careful analysis of Commerce Clause case law and policy makes clear
that the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) exceeds the authority granted to
Congress by the U.S. Constitution.
B. REFRAMING THE ISSUE—USING CONGRESS’S TREATY POWER

Despite the failure of the Foreign Commerce Clause to support the
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c), the statute should survive facial
challenges to its constitutionality. Outside of the First Amendment context,
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute will succeed only by
“establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute]
would be valid.” 183 An examination of Congress’s power to legislate to
enforce the United States’ treaty obligations shows that § 2423(c) is likely
constitutional.
The Constitution endows Congress, through Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the authority to pass
laws to implement treaties. 184 The executive branch has the power to make
treaties. 185 But once a valid treaty has been enacted, it falls on Congress to
pass legislation, if necessary, to enforce the treaty’s provisions. 186 If a
treaty is valid, “there can be no dispute about the validity of [statutes] under
Article I, Section 8, [enacted] as a necessary and proper means to execute
181

Id.
See sources cited supra note 135.
183
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The First Amendment is unique
because it also recognizes an “overbreadth” doctrine. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269
n.18 (1984).
184
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also United States v. Belfast, 611
F.3d 783, 804 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Collectively, these clauses empower Congress to enact any
law that is necessary and proper to effectuate a treaty made pursuant to Article II.”); United
States v. Flath, 11-CR-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2011)
(recommending to the district court that “it was proper for Congress to enact § 2423(c) under
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to implement the Optional Protocol”).
185
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
186
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d
79, 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
182
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the powers of the Government.” 187
For example, in 2001, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 2340A and related
statutes to implement the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 188 The Eleventh
Circuit tested the constitutionality of this enactment in United States v.
Belfast. 189 The Belfast court held that “[t]he United States validly adopted
the CAT pursuant to the President’s Article II treaty-making authority, and
it was well within Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
to criminalize [] torture, as defined by the Torture Act.”190 The defendant
argued that § 2340A exceeded Congress’s power to pass laws to implement
treaties domestically, because the language of the statute was broader than
the language of the treaty. 191 But the Belfast court observed that statutory
language does not have to mirror treaty language verbatim; it only has to
track treaty language in all “material respects.”192
In 2002 (just a year before enacting the PROTECT Act) the United
States ratified the Optional Protocol.193 The Optional Protocol expressed
“grave[] concern[] at the significant and increasing international traffic of
children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution, and child
pornography.” 194 The treaty requires party states to prohibit the sale of
children, child prostitution, and child pornography. 195 The treaty explicitly
calls upon each member party to ensure that those offenses are “fully
covered under its criminal or penal law, whether these offences are
committed domestically or transnationally.” 196 The Optional Protocol
builds on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires
member states—including the United States—to “take all appropriate
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the
child from all forms of physical or mental violence, . . . including sexual
187

Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 (2004); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). For another example, see
Lue, 134 F.3d at 84 (upholding the constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act as a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to pass domestic laws
enforcing the Hostage Taking Convention).
189
611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010).
190
Id. at 793.
191
Id. at 803.
192
Id. at 806 (citing Lue, 134 F.3d at 84).
193
Optional Protocol, supra note 7.
194
Id. at pmbl.
195
Id. at art. 1.
196
Id. at art. 3, ¶ 1.
188
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abuse.” 197 The Optional Protocol explicitly calls for member states,
including the United States, to implement domestic legislation protecting
children from sexual abuse by their citizens, regardless of whether the abuse
occurs domestically or overseas. Because § 2423(c) responds to that
command, it is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to pass
legislation to enforce treaty obligations.
Some courts have observed, in dicta, that the Optional Protocol
authorized Congress to pass § 2423(c). 198 One U.S. magistrate speculated
that “§ 2423 was passed to enforce a multilateral treaty designed to protect
children from transnational and domestic child sex prostitution.” 199 She
concluded that “it was proper for Congress to enact § 2423(c) under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to implement the Optional
Protocol.” 200 Because § 2423(c) rationally relates to specific Articles of the
Optional Protocol dealing with child prostitution, the statute “reasonably
implements the Optional Protocol.” 201 Even the Pendleton district court
contemplated that § 2423(c) and (f)(1) are “‘necessary and proper’ to the
implementation of the United States’ international treaty obligations” under
the Optional Protocol. 202 Courts should more confidently rely on
Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause power to implement the Optional
Protocol when considering the constitutionality of § 2423(c), rather than
relying on the Commerce Clause analysis challenged in Part III.A.
C. AVOIDING THE ISSUE—RENEWED ABILITY TO PROSECUTE
UNDER § 2423(B)

Even if a court eventually decides that § 2423(c) is not a valid exercise
of congressional authority—or if prosecutors want to avoid relying on

197

Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, at art. 19.
United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 798–99 (W.D. Tex. 2009); United
States v. Pendleton, No. 08-111-GMS, 2009 WL 330965, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009);
United States v. Bianchi, No. 06-19, 2007 WL 1521123, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2007);
United States v Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2007); see also United
States v. Flath, 11-CR-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2011). Although
the Flath district court decided the case on the narrower Foreign Commerce Clause ground,
see United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (2012), and did not adopt the portion of
the magistrate’s recommendation relating to the Optional Protocol, it did note that “it finds
no discernible fault with the [m]agistrate’s recommendation in th[at] regard.” Id.
199
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (referring to the Optional Protocol).
200
Flath, 2011 WL 6299941, at *9.
201
Id.
202
Pendleton, 2009 WL 330965, at *4 (citing S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, 39 L.L.M.
1285); see also Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–58; United States v. Pepe, No. 07-168 DSF,
slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007).
198
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§ 2423(c) until its constitutional status is more settled203—prosecutors can
obtain substantially the same results by using § 2423(b) to prosecute child
molesters whose conduct occurs overseas.204 Section 2423(b) stands on
solid constitutional ground. 205 The criminal act in § 2423(b) is not
necessarily the exploitation of a child, but rather “the foreign travel with an
illicit intent.” 206 Because § 2423(b) criminalizes traveling with the intent to
commit a sexual offense with a minor, offenders accomplish their criminal
purpose when they use the channels of commerce. 207
The current version of § 2423(c) “targets the same individuals as does
§ 2423(b),” but attempts to make it easier for prosecutors to punish those
individuals. 208 Although it is admirable to increase prosecutions of
individuals who take advantage of lax foreign laws on sex offenses, it is not
permissible to do so by violating constitutional precepts. Rather,
prosecutors should take advantage of trial strategies that are becoming
increasingly popular—and successful—in child sex exploitation cases
where intent must be proven but is difficult to prove by direct evidence.209
First, a major advance in resources available to prosecutors seeking to
prove intent under § 2423(b) is the increasing willingness of courts to admit
expert testimony on the behavior and characteristics of child molesters. 210
203

Prosecutors can, of course, use both 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (c) where appropriate.
An added advantage of relying on § 2423(b) is that it avoids the overcriminalization
debate that § 2423(c) might provoke. The propriety of criminal statutes lacking a mens rea
requirement, such as § 2423(c), has been hotly contested.
See Reining in
Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Robert C. “Bobby” Scott, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (referring to the “disturbing disappearance of the
common law requirement of mens rea”). Further, critics of overcriminalization are
concerned at the rapid growth of the federal criminal code and argue against the
implementation of duplicative statutes. See id. at 1–2. Because § 2423(c) strikes at largely
the same conduct as § 2423(b), but removes the intent requirement, it is fertile ground for
overcriminalization objections. Section 2423(b) has no such problems.
205
See, e.g., United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006)); United States v. Bredimus,
352 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Shutts, No. 07-20816-CR, 2008 WL
162662, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008); United States v. Kaechele, 466 F. Supp. 2d 868,
892–99 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
206
United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 796 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (citing
Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 210).
207
See, e.g., Shutts, 2008 WL 162662, at *4.
208
United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir. 2011).
209
See Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 162 (wondering why “the government would need or
even want to charge § 2423(c) violations when the evidence of § 2423(b) violations . . .
is . . . clear”).
210
See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that
testimony by a behavioral scientist was admissible as expert testimony where it “‘focused
204
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As an example, in United States v. Hayward, a behavioral scientist and FBI
agent, Kenneth Lanning, was permitted to testify regarding “patterns
exhibited by many acquaintance child molesters.”211 Those patterns include
“selection of victims from dysfunctional homes, formulation of a
customized seduction process, lowering the victim’s inhibitions about sex,
isolating the victim, and soliciting the victim’s cooperation in the
victimization process.” 212
The defendant in Hayward argued that Agent Lanning’s testimony
violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibits an expert in a
criminal case from stating an opinion “about whether the defendant did or
did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the
crime charged or of a defense.” 213 The Hayward court rejected this
argument, recognizing that the circuit courts have long approved admission
of expert testimony that “merely supports an inference or conclusion that
the defendant did or did not have the requisite mens rea, so long as the
expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury.” 214
Courts have interpreted Rule 704(b) to permit expert testimony
regarding characteristics of sex offenders generally but not regarding
experts’ opinions as to whether a particular defendant is a sex offender or is
guilty of the crime charged. 215 Thus, in Hayward, because Agent Lanning
never testified directly about the defendant’s personal mens rea, only about
the typical motives and practices of a child molester, his testimony did not
violate Rule 704(b) and was properly admitted over objection. 216 Similarly,
in United States v. Romero, the court permitted Agent Lanning to testify
regarding characteristics of sex offenders:
[T]he main thrust of Agent Lanning’s testimony described the modus operandi of
modern child molesters: devoting large amounts of time to finding and establishing
relationships with children; choosing emotionally or mentally disturbed children
because of their susceptibility to manipulation; probing the child’s needs and interests
and then mirroring those needs or attempting to fulfill them; and engaging in
217
compulsive behavior even when that behavior increases the risk of getting caught.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that expert testimony serves to
primarily on the modus operandi—on the actions normally taken by child molesters to find
and seduce their victims’”) (quoting United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 586 (7th Cir.
1999)). But see United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010).
211
Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636.
212
Id.
213
FED. R. EVID. 704(b); Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636.
214
Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636 (citing United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 185 (3d Cir.
1998); United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 1997)).
215
See, e.g., Hayward, at 636; Romero, 189 F.3d at 582.
216
Hayward, 359 F.3d at 636–37.
217
Romero, 189 F.3d at 585.
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illuminate the criminal nature behind what seems like innocent conduct,
which can help a jury decide whether a defendant had the intent to molest a
specific child. 218
In Pendleton, the testimony of an expert like Agent Lanning could
have been used to provide the jury with enough background knowledge to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant traveled in foreign
commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with Dieter. 219
Pendleton certainly spent a lot of time cultivating a relationship with Dieter.
He spent over six months corresponding with Dieter by mail and visiting
Dieter at his group home before molesting him on the bike trip. Pendleton
targeted an emotionally vulnerable boy—he had a deceased father and a
sick mother and lived in an orphanage with virtually no other contact with
the outside world. He spent time building up a shared interest—biking—
that he later used to take advantage of Dieter. And, when he sent a letter to
Dieter after molesting him, he likely engaged in “compulsive behavior even
when that behavior increase[d] the risk of being caught.” 220
Further, in addition to admitting expert testimony, courts have allowed
witnesses to testify at § 2423 trials regarding a defendant’s past abuse of
children. 221 Courts have admitted such testimony as modus operandi
evidence over defense counsel objections that it is impermissible propensity
evidence, admission of which violates Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).222
Courts have admitted such evidence under Rules 413 and 414, which allow
evidence of a defendant’s previous crimes of sexual assault and child
molestation that “demonstrat[es] a propensity to commit such crimes.”223
As with the expert testimony, this tool could have been used to convict
Pendleton under § 2423(b). At Pendleton’s trial, the prosecution produced
a witness, Mark Rowe, who testified that when he was approximately
twelve years old, Pendleton molested him. 224 Pendleton’s molestation of
Mark and his molestation of Dieter bore striking similarities. As with
218
Id. at 586 (analogizing to expert testimony admitted in drug trafficking cases to
comment on the criminal purpose behind social behavior of drug traffickers).
219
The significance is that the government could have obtained a conviction under the
constitutionally sound 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) instead of the potentially constitutionally
deficient § 2423(c).
220
Romero, 189 F.3d at 585.
221
FED. R. EVID. 414; see, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 626–27 (7th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2009).
222
McGuire, 627 F.3d at 626–27.
223
Id. at 627.
224
Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 191–96. Again, the victim is now over
eighteen years of age, but his name has been changed throughout this Comment. See supra
note 45.
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Dieter, Pendleton knew Mark for several months before committing any
acts of molestation and, in Mark, he targeted another child with
psychological problems. 225
The actual conduct also looked quite similar—Pendleton and Mark
were introduced through an adult friend of Pendleton (Mark’s mother), and
Mark was convinced to go on a biking trip with Pendleton. 226 On the trip,
Mark had a tent to himself, but one night, Pendleton came into the tent and
asked Mark if he could give Mark a massage. 227 Pendleton started
massaging the boy’s stomach and then sexually assaulted him. 228 The story
of Pendleton’s pursuit and molestation of Mark runs nearly parallel to that
of his pursuit and molestation of Dieter; it would have been easily admitted
as modus operandi evidence that could have helped a jury infer intent and
likely return a guilty verdict under § 2423(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
The noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) is not a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate “Commerce with foreign Nations.” 229 It may,
however, be a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enact legislation to
enforce treaties to which the United States is a party. Thus, prosecutions of
individuals under § 2423(c)—like the prosecution of Thomas Pendleton—
are permissible under the U.S. Constitution. Further, prosecutors now have
more tools than ever for prosecuting individuals who sexually molest
children abroad under § 2423(b), which permits prosecutors to avoid using
§ 2423(c) until it stands on sturdier constitutional footing (or, perhaps, to
charge both § 2423(b) and (c), where appropriate).
Ultimately, the analysis contained in Parts II–III of this section does
not apply only to § 2423(c). Rather, the analytical framework and
conclusion offered apply to any statute criminalizing conduct occurring
entirely overseas. As Congress seeks to expand its reach extraterritorially,
it is increasingly important that courts adequately consider these issues in
evaluating defendants’ inevitable constitutional challenges. Further, it
would be advisable for Congress to draft future legislation with these types
of issues in mind.
Adding jurisdictional “hooks,” such as intent
requirements on statutes purporting to regulate travel, or even (albeit
nonbinding) statements of constitutional authority to guide courts’ analyses,
225
226
227
228
229

Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 178.
Id. at 192–94, 198–99.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 200–01.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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may clear up some of the confusion that has led to such drastically
divergent opinions regarding the constitutional justifications for § 2423(c).
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